In view of the severity of the AIDS epidemic in Africa and elsewhere, a pressing public policy concern is how to best design assistance policies for households experiencing an adult death. Better policies will take into account and strengthen existing household coping mechanisms, rather than duplicating or undermining them. In this paper we investigate the nature of coping mechanisms among a sample of households in Kagera, Tanzania in 1991-94, by estimating the magnitude and timing of receipts of private transfers, public assistance and loans by households with different characteristics. The empirical strategy addresses three methodological difficulties which are common to any attempt to estimate the impact of, or response to, adult death: selection bias, endogeneity, and heterogeneity. We find that less poor households (i.e. those with more physical and human capital) benefit from larger receipts of private assistance, but receive less public assistance initially after the death. On the other hand, poor households rely more than less poor ones on loans for up to a year after a death. Though the loans in this sample are largely private, these results suggest that the expansion of micro-credit programs as well as targeted grant programs may help the poorest households in areas hard-hit by the AIDS epidemic.
. Most studies from central and southern Africa show that HIV infection rates are higher among the wealthier and more educated segments of the population (Ainsworth and Semali 1998) . AIDS is ravaging the ranks of the skilled and educated, with potentially tragic consequences for future growth. The AIDS epidemic is consuming a greater share of government resources that could have been put to other uses. World Bank research indicates that in poor countries, the annual average cost of treating one AIDS patient was significantly greater than the annual cost of educating ten primary school students (World Bank 1999) . Compounding the impact on aggregate growth, the children of HIV-infected parents may be withdrawn from school if the family can no longer pay fees or buy supplies, or if the child's labor is needed at home, on the farm, or in the marketplace.
The consequences of HIV and AIDS for the household are not the same as other diseases and other causes of death. Because the virus is mainly sexually transmitted, AIDS usually strikes primeage adults, at the peak of their productive and income-earning years, who are often heads of families.
Other things being equal, fatal illness increases household expenses (for health care, and ultimately funerals) at the same time as it reduces household income (due to diminished labor time). Yet according to preliminary work using this dataset, households are at least partly able to compensate for, and in time recover from, the death of a family member (see e.g. Over et al. 1996) . We will try to understand one way in which households cope, by looking at the household's receipt of transfers and other unearned income around a death. We will also attempt to shed some light on the following questions:
• How well do informal institutions for risk-spreading help households after a death?
• How effectively do formal-sector interventions support household coping efforts?
• What policies might be implemented to increase the effectiveness of local risk-bearing institutions?
Previous research using this dataset has found that vulnerability to shocks varies across households, and this may significantly affect the path of development and the distribution of wellbeing in the long run. This confirms research from other areas which shows that the risk-mitigating actions of households lead to slower growth as well as lower current income (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993 , Platteau 1991 , Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1989 Banerjee and Newman 1993, 1998) .
It has also been suggested that mechanisms for informal insurance are fragile and incomplete -they work best for small idiosyncratic shocks, and do not adequately protect the poorest (Jalan and Ravallion 1997; Alderman and Paxson 1992; Coate and Ravallion 1989) . Even when it does work, informal insurance may lead to greater divisions between rich and poor (Fafchamps 1992; Hoff 1998 ).
Thus there is considerable opportunity for public sector intervention, but it is necessary to see where are the gaps in the household's ability to self-insure. What are the unique characteristics of households that cope successfully that enable them to overcome the tragedy relatively quickly? We identify three sources of financial assistance available to households following a death: private transfers, private borrowing, and assistance from public or other formal organizations. The evidence suggests that on average, private transfers provide by far the majority of assistance, but not all households rely equally on these sources. Some households benefit more from private assistance networks, while others depend relatively more on credit or formal assistance.
There is some evidence that assistance from public institutions or NGOs may "crowd out" private assistance: that is, reduce the incentive for private donors to provide assistance (see e.g. Cox and Jimenez 1992) . Estimates of this crowding out effect range from negative one-for-one (Becker 1974) to positive, where public assistance actually stimulates private transfers (Lampman and Smeeding 1983) . The descriptive evidence from Kagera is that private transfer receipts increase with income. In that case, even if there is some crowding out of private transfers, the loss to the poor is relatively small; and the net social benefit of public transfers may be positive. In an earlier version of this paper we could not find any impact of formal assistance on private transfers. In any event, we do not model the crowding-out effect here.
The evidence suggests that households differ systematically in the characteristics and factors that condition the household's response to the crisis. Previous research has established that the epidemic is more likely to affect some segments of the population before others (Ainsworth and Semali 1998) , and that the impact of the crisis differs significantly across, for example, wealth class (World Bank 1999) . In order to identify the determinants of the household's receipt of financial assistance, we need to control for the household-specific factors that influence both the household's exposure to the epidemic and the nature of its response. In the analysis below, we therefore control for attrition bias, endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity. The plan of the paper is as follows: we first describe the survey and data; next, we examine the use of finance from the three sources mentioned above and correlate receipts with death and a range of household characteristics. Finally, we discard the unrealistic assumptions supporting the descriptive analysis (homogeneity and exogeneity) to reveal robust and generalizable links between a household's characteristics and access to and use of various sources of financial assistance.
Survey description
The data come from a four-round panel survey in the Kagera region of northwestern Tanzania, conducted between 1990 and 1994. The region is west of Lake Victoria and borders the Rakai district of Uganda to the north, and Rwanda and Burundi to the west. More than 80 percent of the population lives in the rural areas, most of them in agriculture. The farming system consists of tree crops (bananas and coffee), annual crops (maize, sorghum and cotton) and livestock.
Adult mortality is relatively high in Kagera, partly due to the early spread of HIV and AIDS.
The first recorded case of AIDS in the region was in 1983, but the virus was probably present at least a decade earlier. The region is a crossroads for goods traffic, and was affected by the war between Tanzania and Uganda in the late 1970s. More recently, it has provided a haven for refugees fleeing Rwanda and Burundi.
A population-based seroprevalence survey in Bukoba, the regional capital, in 1987, found that roughly a quarter of the prime-aged (15-50) adults were infected with HIV, as were up to 10 percent in the surrounding areas.
Although AIDS has severely affected parts of central and southern Africa, and is widely prevalent in the survey region, it is not the largest cause of death in the sample. The survey was conducted over a three-year period from 1990 to 1994, during which some 9.6 percent of sample individuals died (compared to a crude death rate in Tanzania of 1.4 percent in 1995 [World Bank 1999] ). About 40 percent of sample deaths can be directly attributed to AIDS. Including deaths in the year prior to the survey period, 44 percent of household-wave observations have experienced a death at some point in the past.
The region was stratified by cluster and village, and all households within selected villages were given an initial enumeration survey. From that enumeration, 838 households were selected to receive the first round of the complete household survey. Since adult mortality was still a relatively rare event, households that indicated recent experience with severe illness in the initial enumeration were oversampled. Altogether, 913 households were interviewed at least once. 3 The total sample consists of 3368 household-wave observations.
After each round, some households dropped out and were replaced. Of the original sample drawn from the enumeration, 6 percent dropped prior to their first interview. Of the remaining sample of households, 10 percent dropped out prior to the end of the survey (round 4) (Ainsworth 1995 (Glewwe and Jacoby 2000) ; and the Kagera study has a per-round (per-wave) dropout rate of 2.5 percent.
It might be expected that those households that are most severely affected by a death are more likely to drop out. After all, only intact households can remain to be interviewed again, and the disaster can be so severe as to destroy the household. If that is the case, the sample is biased in favor of "more successful," or less severely affected households. This would minimize any measurement of the impact of the disease, and weaken our ability to draw meaningful inferences from the analysis.
Examination of the data does not suggest any systematic bias. While households that drop out are smaller, with fewer assets, they have younger household heads with more education. Households that drop out are also less likely to have suffered a death than households that remain. 4 This suggests that more mobile households drop out, rather than more adversely affected ones.
Another source of potential bias in the data is that the replacement households may be systematically different from the remaining population. In addition, households joining the survey after the first passage do not have the opportunity to complete all four waves. For example, the replacement households joining between waves 1 and 2 could at most complete three waves (2, 3, and 4). If these households are systematically different, the fact that we observe them for a shorter amount of time may further bias the results. T-tests for significant differences between the replacement households and the original population reveal that replacement households do receive significantly fewer transfers and formal assistance. This may reflect bias in the sample; on the other hand, it more likely reflects the fact that the replacement households are also less likely to suffer a death. However, since the original sample was chosen with an oversampling of households with a recent illness, it could be that the replacements are randomly drawn, but the original sample is biased towards exaggerating the impact of a death.
Comparing replacement households with drop-out households does reveal some differences:
replacement households are wealthier, older, and larger than those that drop out, but there is no difference in death experience. While these casual examinations leads us to believe that there is no bias in the sample, we control for both drop-out and replacement in the initial analysis below. We will show, however, that it is the household's characteristics underlying the probability of dropping out which matter, and not the act of dropping out itself. We control for these and other unobserved characteristics in the econometric analysis.
In much of the analysis below, we also drop 10 observations for which some data are missing, and we drop 14 observations for which the dependent variables are extreme outliers -that is, they fall outside the interval formed by the mean ± 10 standard deviations. Five of these 14 observations are for households that have experienced a death in the past.
The impact of AIDS on households, and household responses to the crisis
Previous analysis of this dataset (see Over et al. 1996 and World Bank 1999) has found that households with a death have higher total expenses as well as higher expenditures on all components of consumption than households in which no death has occurred. This is not because death makes one wealthy, but because in this sample, wealthier households are more likely to suffer a death.
The impact of a death on well-being depends largely on the resources available to the household. Not all households suffer in the same way, or to the same extent, or for the same length of time. For the poorer half of households in the sample, both food expenditure and food consumption fall dramatically in the six months following a death (Figure 1 ). For the non-poor half, food expenditure and consumption actually rise following a death. This again suggests that households are heterogeneous both in the impact of the crisis and in the ways they respond to it.
Why does the impact of a death differ so dramatically across households? If the ability to cope differs across wealth class, is it simply that wealthier households are wealthier, and are better "self-insured?" However, the consequences of a death may differ according to the type of coping mechanism used by the household, and not just the level. To see this we must first examine the characteristics of households in which people die, and how households respond to a death. The household can conceive of a hierarchy of responses to a crisis, which can be classified, for example, by reversibility. According to this criterion, re-allocating labour is preferable to selling productive assets such as a bullock team.
The adverse events that households face can be distinguished by ubiquity and recurrence.
Some shocks affect only individual households, independently of others. Non-infectious illness, injuries, and (except in epidemics) death are examples of such "idiosyncratic" shocks. Drought, in contrast, usually affects entire regions. Some shocks, such as unemployment, may be related both to individual characteristics and common events such as business cycles. Some shocks may be repeated over time. Deaton (1997) found that the ability of households to maintain consumption diminishes as the "autocorrelation" in shocks rises. Households can draw on assets to smooth consumption over the course of one drought; a succession of droughts is more difficult to overcome. On the other hand, some degree of repetition makes it possible to learn from experience -to apply the lessons learned during one event to future events, thereby lessening their adverse consequences. Gertler and Gruber (1997) found that households in Indonesia are better able to insure consumption against more frequent risks such as illness and idiosyncratic unemployment than against rare shocks such as death. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998) argue that poor households are relatively constrained in their choice of coping mechanisms: "the relatively poor tend to smooth income more than consumption while the relatively wealthy tend to smooth consumption alone (p.90)." The choice of response may reflect limited opportunities among poor households, rather than differences in preferences. Table 1 presents bivariate correlations of the dependent variables (transfers, credit, and official assistance), as well as a range of characteristics that may determine both the ability of the household to withstand the shock and the household's receipts of outside assistance. 5 The first set of columns compares means across death experience. Households that have experienced a death receive more net private transfers than households that have not suffered a death, but the difference is not statistically significant. They also receive less in credit than those without a death -in fact, those with a death appear to be net lenders -but again the within-variance is sufficiently large to eliminate differences between the groups. Households with a death do receive more assistance from NGOs, government, or other formal institutions.
As noted above, households with a death are larger and wealthier (in terms of physical assets). They are more likely to have older and female household heads. Also, consistent with the earlier discussion of attrition, households with a death are more likely to have arrived in wave 1 of the survey and remain for all 4 waves. Households with a death are less likely to drop out and less likely to be chosen as a replacement.
The variables describing household human and physical capital are highly correlated with each other. The last two columns in the table give the factor loadings and coefficients for the first principal components of these characteristics, which explain 82 percent of the variation in all 6
variables. Since the coefficients are positive for all variables except the age of the household head, the index can be interpreted loosely as an index of household resources (i.e. human and physical capital). We use the index in the empirical work in the following section.
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Transfers and borrowing in response to an adult death
As mentioned earlier, the bereaved household can cope economically with a death in many ways: seek financial assistance either from friends and relatives, or from a formal government or nongovernment assistance agency; change the mix of crops grown on family plots; alter members' time allocation between labor market participation, work at home and school; sell assets; recruit or shed household members; or reduce consumption of some or all household members. The objective of this paper is to learn more about the receipt of formal and informal transfers and credit.
Private inter-household transfers are observed throughout the world, and they often comprise a significant part of household income. More than 90 percent of rural households in India report receiving private transfers (Cox and Jimenez 1990) , as do 20-75 percent of households in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet republics (Barberia, Johnson and Kaufmann 1998) , and 15 percent of households in the U.S. (Cox and Jimenez 1990 Platteau and Abraham 1987 , Eswaran and Kotwal 1989 , and Udry 1990 on credit). Fafchamps and Lund (1998) argue that local informal assistance can be described as "quasi-credit." That is, when limited enforcement constrains participation in mutual assistance programs, risk is mitigated by a combination of low-or zero-interest loans, combined with gifts.
However, there may be a significant difference between credit and transfers, in that the former requires a more formal and explicit arrangement (even though that arrangement can be flexible). When the informal exchange contract is unenforceable, the donor will insist on a more formal arrangement that forces the recipient to reciprocate, or protects his donation with some security. To the extent that the loans are given at positive interest rates, or that collateral is pledged with a positive probability of default, that increases the cost of finance relative to a scheme of repeated interest-free mutual assistance.
This raises the question of the distribution of the sources of finance. Do all households have access to these resources? Table 2 describes the incidence of (positive net) receipts by source. We distinguish in this table by (wave 1) wealth and by death experience. Among the poorer half of households, 60 percent receive some formal assistance, less than half are net recipients of private transfers, and one-sixth are net borrowers in the private credit market. Among the wealthier half of households, two-thirds receive some formal assistance, more than half are net recipients of private transfers, and the same percentage are net borrowers in the private credit market.
There is a greater distinction between households that have experienced a death in the past and those that have not. The former are more likely to receive private transfers (60 percent v. 44 percent) and public assistance (68 percent v. 60 percent). On the other hand, they are slightly less likely to borrow (17 percent v. 18 percent). The majority (56 percent) of the 670 poor households that have experienced a death receive formal assistance, as does the majority (62 percent) of non-poor households with a death.
While Table 2 shows that there is little difference in the incidence of access to sources of financial assistance across wealth class -that is, the proportion of households using each source is broadly similar -there may be greater differences in the amounts received across classes. Figure 2 describes the cumulative distribution of transfers received. 7 The smooth curve rising monotonically from zero to one is a Lorenz curve for total expenditures -in which equality is implied by the diagonal line from zero to one. The other lines are concentration curves -that is, the proportion of assistance from each source that go to each cumulative proportion of the total income (expenditure) distribution. In principle, if the curve depicting the distribution of an item is above the Lorenz curve, it is relatively more equitable than the prevailing income distribution, in the sense that that segment of the population receives a larger share of that item than it receives of aggregate income; if it is below the Lorenz curve, that segment of the population receives proportionally less of it than would be consistent with its share of aggregate income. If the distribution curve is above the diagonal, then that segment of the population also receives more in absolute terms than other parts of the population.
This figure shows that formal assistance is more equitably distributed than private transfers, although both are progressively distributed (since they are both above the Lorenz curve). The more striking feature of this figure is the distribution of private credit (we superimpose a smoothed curve to ease interpretation). These curves are all net, so that private transfers are those received minus those given out, and credit is the difference between borrowing and lending. The credit curve can be interpreted in terms of progressivity, but it also shows that the poorer half of the population are net borrowers, while the wealthier half are net lenders. The poorer half, in this figure, borrow more than they would be expected to if the distribution of credit reflected the prevailing income distribution; they also borrow more than average, and they borrow more than the wealthy. The credit curve is far more variable in the top half of the income distribution, which reflects the fact that a few wealthy households account for the majority of borrowing and lending activity. Figure 2 shows that private assistance is proportional to total income (expenditure), but the amount of both private transfers and formal assistance received by the poor is significantly less in absolute terms than that received by the wealthy. The wealthy are also more likely to receive private transfers from other regions within Tanzania, or abroad.
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Estimating transfer receipts and borrowing
If one were to solve a system of structural equations for all of these household response variables for transfers received, r i,t , as a function of whether there has been a death, D i,t , (a dummy variable equal to one if a death has occurred to household i prior to period t), and the included exogenous variables from all the equations, the result would be the following equation:
where π 0 is a constant term, X i,t is a row vector of all the exogenous variables included in all the structural equations, Π is a column vector of parameters and the parameter θ measures the total impact of death on remittances via both direct and indirect routes. The error term is composed of two parts: an unobserved, household-specific error η i , and a random error ε it . Assuming that the occurrence of a death is exogenous to the system of response variables and independent of the two error terms, it would in theory be possible to estimate the parameter θ consistently by ordinary least squares. More efficient estimates could be obtained by applying error components estimation techniques.
While the data set contains a great many variables measured at the community level which can reasonably be supposed to be exogenous to household decisions, deciding a priori which of these variables belongs in each of the structural equations requires strong assumptions. Rather than attempting to distinguish those exogenous variables which directly affect one of the endogenous response variables from those which have only indirect effects, we choose to move the vector X i,t of exogenous variables into the error terms. With this change, we rewrite equation (1) Table 3 reveals that correcting for endogeneity dramatically increases the response of transfers to death by factors of 3.6, 6.9 and 7.3 for the three components of total receipts and by a factor of 3.9 for the total (although the impact of death is insignificant to private credit in this table).
In contradiction to the bivariate comparisons of Table 2 , the IV estimates show two of the three components of transfers, net private transfers and formal assistance, to respond significantly to death, both in statistical terms and in relation to their absolute level. In a sample for which total net receipts average 1,470 Tanzanian shillings per adult equivalent member each six months, the household is estimated to receive an additional 5,300 shillings after a death. The IV estimates of the impact of death on receipt of private transfers are illustrated in Figure 3 . Tables 4 and 5 relax the assumptions of Table 3 that transfers received respond to a death in the same way for all households and that higher levels of receipts endure permanently after a death. estimates, both death and time-since the death remain statistically significant. On the other hand, controlling for the household-specific error component renders the attrition variables insignificant, suggesting that this technique successfully controls for the unmeasured household characteristics that are associated with both receipts and attrition.
In Table 5 , using only EC2SLS, we expand our analysis of the variation in transfer response to consider the effect of household resources on the size and timing of receipts. The results show that receipts respond to death and to the time since the death, and that the response varies according to the amount of household resources. Household resources are indexed using the coefficients of the first principal component as presented in Table 2 .
The regressions indicate that receipts do respond to the death, and to the time since the death, and that the response varies according to the resources the household can command. We use the results of the regressions to simulate the evolution of the household's receipts of assistance following a death. Figure 4 presents the simulation of the median household's receipts of total assistance (the sum of private transfers, formal assistance, and private credit) for the 30 months following the death.
The solid curve shows the predicted receipts of total financial assistance; the dashed lines show the 90% confidence interval. The vertical (left) axis depicts the rate of receipts in thousand TSh per capita. The horizontal line in each panel, labelled on the right axis, is the counterfactual estimate of receipts for households that have not suffered a death. The impact of a death on receipts is computed as the statistically significant difference between the solid curve and the counterfactual. 9 In addition to suggesting the bias resulting from uncorrected endogeneity in estimating household responses, Table 3 also suggests that attrition matters: the dummy variables representing attrition are statistically significant in the IV regressions. But see the discussion of Table 4 below.
The median household receives financial assistance at the rate of about 30,000 TSh per year 10 immediately after the death, and continues to receive assistance until 18 months after the death. 11 In total, the median household receives roughly 144,000 TSh in financial assistance during that 18-month period, which is more than this household's estimated per-capita expenditures for the period.
At first glance, this is evidence of a well-functioning informal insurance network. The bereaved household is significantly compensated for the death. However, the question then arises whether this insurance system exists for all households. If so, does it function as well for all classes of households? To answer this question, we simulate the evolution of financial assistance following a death for typical poor and wealthy households. In addition, we distinguish financial assistance by source, to see whether the private response to a death differs from the response of public and nongovernmental institutions.
The top three panels of Figure 5 (5a, 5b and 5c) present the estimated response and its 90%
confidence interval for households at the tenth percentile of household resources; i.e. very poor households. The bottom three panels (5d, 5e, and 5f) present the same calculations for a household at the ninetieth percentile of household resources. As in Figure Contrast the picture for private transfers with those of formal assistance and private borrowing. The less poor also receive formal assistance, but not until about nine months after the death. They receive some, but not much, private credit. On the other hand, the lack of significant amounts of private transfers for the poorest households, apparently forces them to depend on the latter two forms of receipts. However the total amount flowing from these is less than ten thousand shillings (per half-year) on the date of the death, half that received by the less poor on that day, and poor households continue to receive transfers for only a year, as opposed to the eighteen months that private transfers endure for the less poor (panels 5a and 5d).
10 The surveys were conducted at six-month intervals, and the figures here use the half-year as the time unit. The estimate of 30,000 TSh per year is twice the point estimate (14,600) illustrated in the figure; in other words, the annualized rate at which these households receive transfers immediately following a death. 11 We compute the assistance received as the area under the curve and above the counterfactual, from the date of the death until the date at which the estimate is not significantly different from zero (that is, when the 90% confidence interval crosses the counterfactual).
The bottom of Table 5 presents estimates of the size of the response at the two ends of the household resource distribution for the different components of receipts. Six months after the death, resource-rich households are receiving transfers at the annual rate of 27,000 TSh. At the same time, the resource-poor households receive no private transfers, but do get assistance from formal institutions at the rate of 4,400 TSh per year, and are borrowing an additional 4,600 TSh per year.
One year after the death, the rich are still receiving private transfers at a rate of 17,000 TSh per year, whereas the poor have stopped receiving any assistance, whether in the form of private transfers, formal assistance, or credit. Figure 6 and column (4) of Table 5 present the household's total receipts of financial assistance, again by the number of months since the death and index of household resources. In total, the resource-poor household could possibly receive assistance at the rate of 18,800 TSh per adult equivalent member one month after the death, which is a respectable half of the 37,000 TSh received by the resource abundant household (though the estimate for the poor is not statistically significant).
If the distribution of financial assistance were maintained at this rate over time for all households, it would be an impressively progressive allocation. As a percentage of total income, the annual rate of receipts would amount to a quarter of per-capita expenditure for the poor, and 13 percent of per-capita expenditure for the rich.
Over the course of the first year following a death, poor households receive about 52,400 TSh per capita, while rich households receive about 176,000 TSh per capita. 12 This is still progressive, as it represents about 70 percent of total per-capita expenditures of the poor, and 63 percent of total percapita expenditures for the rich. However, the receipts of assistance by resource-poor households diminish rapidly with time, and are completely gone within one year after the death, while those of the resource abundant household persist for almost two years. While the total received by the poor is 52,400 TSh (all in the first year), the rich receive a total of about 280,000 TSh per capita in the 30 months following the death, coincidentally, exactly the annual per-capita expenditure among rich households.
Conclusions
This paper has tried to understand one of the mechanisms by which households deal with a death. Clearly, some households fare much worse than others. But that observation itself motivates the key question: why do some households manage better than others? The household's human and physical capital -the ability to self-insure -is part of the answer. Households with sufficient resources may not need formal-sector assistance.
Resource-abundant households rely more on private transfers, whereas resource-poor households rely relatively more on credit. These results seem to support the hypothesis of Fafchamps and Lund, that credit acts as insurance in cases where informal contracts are not enforceable. In Kagera, a donor household will make transfers to a rich household, and trust that the recipient will repay in the future. There is an implicit contract for repayment. For poor households, the contract must be explicit: I will help you if you are poor and in crisis, but I want an explicit promise of repayment, not merely an implicit one. I don't trust that you will be able to repay; I need some guarantee. If this is true, it means that the impact of the death is potentially even worse for poor households -not only are they hit harder, but they must bear a larger part of the burden alone.
Thus resource-abundant households are wealthy not only in physical and human assets, but also in "social" assets, or social capital. They have a larger, broader, and presumably wealthier network of friends and relatives on whom they can depend in times of crisis. They are more likely to receive private assistance, and they receive more assistance, than poorer households. In an environment of incomplete and unenforceable contracts, a larger social network provides greater resources for common risk-pooling.
These quasi-insurance transactions are personalized functions of the characteristics of donor and recipient, not impersonal market transactions. The expected returns to gifts given depend on information about the ability of the recipient to reciprocate in the future -that is, expected future creditworthiness or vulnerability. Thus it may be reasonable even for a poor donor to give more to a wealthy recipient than to another poor recipient, if the expected returns to gifts made to a wealthy household exceed those of gifts to a poor household.
Those outside the network, the resource-poor, can only have access to the risk-pooling resources through formal credit contracts. Even assuming the rate of interest is actuarially fair, the cost of risk aversion is far greater for the poor than for the rich, since the risk of default and loss of collateral is not zero. For the rich, inability to reciprocate the assistance will reduce access to future assistance, but will not imply the loss of currently productive assets.
What are the policy implications of these findings? First, government and non-government agencies made a substantial difference to resource poor households which had suffered an adult deaths in Kagera, Tanzania in 1990 . According to the point estimates in Third, since panel 5e shows that resource abundant households receive assistance also, though with a lower priority than do the poor households, suggests that formal assistance programs could provide more assistance to the poorest households by limiting the amount given to the betteroff. This suggestion must not be taken lightly, however, since strict adherence to progressive targeting criteria can undermine the political support for a subsidy program (Sen, 1995, Gelbach and Pritchett 1997) . In addition, it is difficult to design accurate targeting mechanisms (Lundberg and Diskin 1995) , and attempts to reduce false positives (capture by non-needy households) often lead to increases in false negatives (omitting truly needy households).
Finally, resource poor households in Kagera avail themselves even more of loans than they do of formal assistance in response to a death. And they do so even more than do resource abundant households. Many of the loans taken in this sample may be "quasi-credit," that is, flexible arrangements in which repayment is contingent on changes in the fortunes of borrower and lender.
The Kagera survey did not elicit interest rates, so further data is required before we can estimate the actual costs of borrowing; but it is safe to say that the costs of insuring consumption against a death are higher for poor households than non-poor households. Credit and transfers are structurally different: interest rates on loans are likely to be positive, and loans may require the borrower to forfeit collateral with a positive probability of default. The evidence suggests that the poor are excluded from the relatively more flexible transfer scheme, and rely more on private credit. Thus, to the extent that micro-credit programs improve access and lower the total costs of borrowing, they may be effective not only for their usual purpose of stimulating investment in micro-enterprises, but also in helping the most resource poor households to cope with the impacts of an adult death in areas hard-hit by the AIDS epidemic. Predicted deaths come from a linear probability model. Death is predicted for observations with a predicted probability of death greater than or equal to .5. The 
